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Prohibit the abuse of the exclusion of intellectual property rights and restriction of competition behavior

Article 1 In order to prevent and stop the abuse of abuse of intellectual property exclusion and restrict competition, these regulations are formulated in accordance with the "Anti -Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China" (hereinafter referred to as antitrust law).

Article 2 Anti -monopoly and protection of intellectual property rights have a common goal, that is, to promote competition and innovation, improve economic operation efficiency, and safeguard consumers' interests and social public interests.

Operators exercise intellectual property rights in accordance with the laws and administrative regulations of intellectual property rights, but they must not abuse intellectual property rights, eliminate and restrict competition.

Article 3 The abuse of intellectual property exclusion and restrictions on the abuse of intellectual property refers to the operator to exercise intellectual property rights in violation of the antitrust law, reach a monopoly agreement, abuse the market dominance position, and implement or may have the effects of exclusion and restricting competition effects. Operators are concentratedly monopolized.

Article 4 The State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration (hereinafter referred to as the General Administration of Market Supervision) In accordance with Article 13 (1) of the Anti -Monopoly Law, it is responsible for the unified law enforcement work of antitrust laws that abuse intellectual property rights and restrict competition.

According to Article 13 of the Anti -Monopoly Law, the General Administration of Market Supervision authorizes the market supervision and management departments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities (hereinafter referred to as provincial market supervision departments) responsible for the abuse of knowledge such as monopoly agreements in their own administrative regions and abuse of market dominance. Anti -monopoly law enforcement work of property rights exclusion and restrictions.

The anti -monopoly law enforcement agencies referred to this provision include the General Administration of Market Supervision and the provincial market supervision department.

Article 5 The relevant markets referred to in these provisions include the relevant commodity markets and related regional markets. They are defined in accordance with the Anti -Monopoly Law and the "Guide of the State Council Anti -Monopoly Committee on the Definition of the relevant market", and consider the impact of factors such as intellectual property rights and innovation. In antitrust law enforcement work involving intellectual property permits, the relevant commodity market can be a technology market or a product market containing specific intellectual property rights. Related technology market refers to a market composed of competing between the technologies involved in intellectual property and similar technologies that can be replaced.

Article 6 The operators shall not use the method of exercising intellectual property rights to reach the monopoly agreement prohibited by Article 17 and 18 of Article 18, paragraph 1 of the Anti -Monopoly Law.

The operator shall not use the method of exercising intellectual property rights to organize other operators to reach a monopoly agreement or provide substantial help for other operators to reach a monopoly agreement.

An operator can prove that the agreement reached is the provisions of Article 20 of the Anti -Monopoly Law, and the provisions of the first and second paragraphs are not applicable.

Article 7 The operator uses the method of exercising intellectual property to reach an agreement stipulated in Article 18, paragraph 1, paragraph 1, paragraph 1, and the second item of the transaction counterparty. No, no prohibition.

The operator uses the method of exercising the intellectual property to reach an agreement with the trading counterparte. The operator can prove that the operator participating in the agreement in the relevant market is lower than the standards stipulated by the General Administration of Market Supervision and meet the other conditions stipulated by the General Administration of Market Supervision , No prohibition. The specific standards can be referred to the relevant provisions of the "Anti -Monopoly Guide of the State Council's Anti -Monopoly Committee on the Field of Intellectual Property".

Article 8 An operator with market dominance shall abuse market dominance in the process of exercising intellectual property rights, eliminate and restrict competition.

The market dominance status is determined and prescribed in accordance with the provisions of the Anti -Monopoly Law and the Regulations on the Prosperity of the Obstach of the Marketing Domination. The operator's own intellectual property rights can constitute one of the factors that determine its market dominance, but it cannot only be determined that it has a market dominance in the relevant market according to the operator's own intellectual property rights.

It is determined that an operator with intellectual property rights has a dominant position in the relevant market. You can also consider the possibility of transaction in the relevant market transaction to the technology or product possibility of replacement relationships and the cost of transfer, and the dependence of the downstream market on the use of the goods provided by intellectual property rights provided by intellectual property rights. A degree, trading counterparts' balance of balance of balance.

Article 9 An operator with a market dominance shall not be able to eliminate and restrict competition with products with an unfair high -priced and high -priced or sales of intellectual property in the process of exercising intellectual property rights.

The following factor can be considered as determined that the behavior of the previous paragraph can be considered:

(1) R & D cost and recycling cycle of intellectual property;

(2) Calculation methods and permit conditions for the permission fee of this intellectual property;

(3) The historical license fee or permit fee standard of this intellectual property rights can be compared with;

(4) The operator's commitment made on the intellectual property permission;

(5) Other related factors that need to be considered.

Article 10 An operator with a market dominance does not have a legitimate reason. In the process of exercising intellectual property rights, it shall refuse to permit other operators to use the intellectual property rights with reasonable conditions to eliminate and restrict competition.

The following factors should be considered at the same time: the following factors should be considered at the same time:

(1) The intellectual property rights cannot be reasonably replaced in the relevant market, which is necessary for other operators to participate in the competition in the relevant market;

(2) Rejecting to permit the intellectual property rights will cause competition or innovation in related markets to be adversely affected, harm consumers' interests or social public interests;

(3) The intellectual property rights will not cause unreasonable damage to the operator.

Article 11 The operator with a market dominance does not have a legitimate reason, and may not be engaged in the following limited transaction behavior in the process of exercising intellectual property rights, eliminating and restricting competition:

(1) Limited transactions can only be traded with them;

(2) Limited transactions can only be traded with the designated operators they are designated;

(3) Limited transactions must not be traded with specific operators.

Article 12 An operator with a market dominance does not have a legitimate reason and shall not violate the industry or field trading practice, consumption habits or ignoring the functions of the product in the process of exercising the intellectual property rights. The

(1) Force or mandate in disguise when permits intellectual property rights to purchase other unnecessary products;

(2) Force or mandate in disguise when permitted intellectual property rights to accept a package permit.

Article 13 An operator with a market dominance does not have a legitimate reason, and may not add the following unreasonable trading conditions in the process of exercising intellectual property rights, eliminate and restrict competition:

(1) Requires the transaction counterparty to exclude or exclusively reward its improved technology, or requires cross -licenses in the same technical field when not providing a reasonable consideration;

(2) Prohibit transactions from questioning the validity of their intellectual property rights;

(3) Restricting the transaction counterparty after the expiration of the permit agreement, using competitive technology or products without infringing intellectual property rights;

(4) Attach other unreasonable trading conditions to the trading counterpart.

Article 14 The operator with a market dominance does not have a legitimate reason. In the process of exercising intellectual property rights, it shall be treated differently on transactions with the same conditions, eliminating and restricting competition.

Article 15 If an operator involving intellectual property rights meets the application standards stipulated by the State Council, the operator shall declare to the General Administration of Market Supervision in advance, and shall not be implemented before obtaining approval after being approved or approved.

Article 16 The centralized review of operators involving intellectual property rights shall consider the characteristics and characteristics of intellectual property rights stipulated in Article 33 of the Anti -Monopoly Law.

According to the specific situation of centralized transactions involving intellectual property operators, the additional restrictions can include the following situations:

(1) Dingfeng's business involved in intellectual property or intellectual property rights;

(2) Maintain an independent operation of intellectual property related business;

(3) Permit intellectual property with reasonable conditions;

(4) Other restrictions.

Article 17 The operator shall not use patent associations to engage in exclusion and restricting competition in the process of exercising intellectual property rights.

Members of patent joint venture shall not exchange sensitive information about competition, such as price, output, market division, etc., and reach a monopoly agreement prohibited by Article 17 and 18 of the Antitrust Law. However, the operators can prove that the agreement reached in line with Article 18, paragraph 2, paragraph 3 and 20 of the Anti -Monopoly Law.

Members of patent joint association entities or patent associations with market dominance shall not use patent associations to engage in the following abuse of market dominance:

(1) Patent patent of joint associations at high -priced and high -priced at high prices;

(2) No legitimate reasons, restrict the scope of patent use of associates or permitted people

(3) There are no legitimate reasons, restricting members of the association as an independent licensed patent outside the joint venture;

(4) No legitimate reasons, restricting members of the associates or being permitted to be independent or competing with the patent of joint research and development with third parties

(5) There are no legitimate reasons, for compulsory requesting the licensee to the technical exclusive or exclusive manner of the improvement or research and development of it to members of the patent entity or patent association;

(6) No legitimate reason is prohibited from questioning the effectiveness of the patent of the joint venture

(7) Without a legitimate reason, a compulsory combination permit of competitive patent patent, or the permission of patents that have not been necessary, terminate, and other patent compulsory combinations;

(8) There are no legitimate reasons, and the permission of the same related market with the same conditions or the permission of the same related market shall implement differential treatment in terms of transaction conditions

(9) Other abuse of market dominance identified by the General Administration of Market Supervision.

The patent associates mentioned in these regulations refer to two or more operators who jointly permit their patents to joint members or third parties. All parties of patent joint venture usually entrust members of the associates or independent third parties to manage the associates. Specific methods of associates include reaching an agreement, establishing a company or other entities.

Article 18 The operator does not have a legitimate reason, and shall not use the standards of standards to achieve the following monopoly agreement in the process of exercising intellectual property rights

(1) Jointly exclude the relevant operators' participation in the formulation of standards, or to exclude specific operators with relevant operators with a competitive relationship;

(2) Joint rejection of other specific operators to implement relevant standards with other specific operators with competitive operators

(3) The operator with a competitive relationship agrees not to implement other competitive standards;

(4) Other monopoly agreements identified by the General Administration of Market Supervision.

Article 19 The operator with a market dominance shall not engage in the following acts in the process of formulation and implementation of standards, eliminate and restrict competition:

(1) In the process of participating in the formulation of standards, the organization has not disclosed its right information in a timely manner in accordance with the standards of the standards, or clearly abandon its rights.

(2) After its patent becomes a necessary patent, it violates the principles of fairness, reasonable, and discrimination without discrimination, and is permitted with unfair high -priced permits. There is no legitimate reason to refuse permission, set up goods or add other unreasonable trading conditions, implement differential treatment, etc.

(3) During the process of standards for the necessary patent permits, it violates the principles of fairness, reasonable, and discrimination without discrimination. Without negotiations, the court or other relevant departments are requested to make a judgment, ruling or decision to prohibit the use of relevant intellectual property rights, etc., forcing the permission party to accept Unfair high price or other unreasonable trading conditions;

(4) Other abuse of market dominance identified by the General Administration of Market Supervision.

The necessary patents referred to this provision refer to the essential patent for implementing the standard.

Article 20 The "legitimate reason" referred to in Article 10 to 14, 17 to 19 of these provisions can consider the following factors:

(1) It is conducive to encouraging innovation and promoting fair market competition;

(2) It is necessary to exercise or protect intellectual property;

(3) It is necessary to meet product safety, technical effects, product performance, etc.

(4) For the actual needs of trading counterparts and meet the legitimate industry practice and trading habits;

(5) Other factors that can prove that behavior has legitimacy.

Article 21 The operator shall not engage in the antitrust law and monopoly behavior prohibited by these regulations when exercising the copyright and the rights related to copyright.

Article 22 Analyze and identify that operators are suspected of abuse of intellectual property exclusion and restricting competition behaviors, they may take the following steps:

(1) Determine the nature and expression of the operator's exercise of intellectual property behavior;

(2) Determine the nature of the relationship between operators who exercise intellectual property;

(3) Define the relevant markets involved in the exercise of intellectual property;

(4) The market status of operators who exercise intellectual property rights;

(5) Analysis of the impact of operators' behavior of intellectual property rights on related market competition.

To determine the nature of the relationship between operators, the characteristics of the intellectual property behavior itself need to be considered. In the case of intellectual property permission, the original competitive operator is a transaction relationship in the license agreement, and in the market where the permission and the licensee uses the intellectual property production product, it is a competitive relationship. However, if there is no competitive relationship between operators when setting a license agreement, and a competitive relationship after the agreement is established, it is still not regarded as an agreement between competitors, unless the original agreement changes substantially.

Article 23 The impact of an analysis and identifying the impact of operators' exercise of intellectual property rights on related market competition shall consider the following factors:

(1) The market position of operators and transactions;

(2) Market concentration of related markets;

(3) The degree of difficulty entering the relevant market;

(4) The development stage of industrial practice and industry;

(5) Limited time and effectiveness scope of restrictions in the aspects of production, region, consumer, etc.

(6) Impact on promoting innovation and technological promotion;

(7) The speed of innovation ability and technical changes of the operator;

(8) Other factors related to the influence of the act of exercising intellectual property rights on related market competition.

Article 24 When an antitrust law enforcement agency investigates and punishs the abuse of intellectual property exclusion and restricting competition behavior, in accordance with the Antitrust Law and the "Regulations on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreement", "Regulations on the Prosperity of Out of Marketing Position", "Regulations on the Concentrated Examination of Operators" 》 The specified program execution.

Article 25 If an operator violates the Anti -Monopoly Law and these regulations, and shall reach and implement a monopoly agreement, the antitrust law enforcement agency shall order to stop illegal acts, confiscate illegal income, and shall be at the previous year's sales of more than one percent percentage of more than one percentage of percentage of percentage of percentage. For fines below 10, if there is no sales in the previous year, a fine of less than 5 million yuan; if the monopoly agreement reached that has not been implemented, a fine of less than 3 million yuan may be imposed. If the legal representative, the principals, and the person in charge of the directly responsible person who have the personal responsibility of reaching a monopoly agreement may be imposed by a fine of less than one million yuan.